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ABSTRACT
Advanced life-sustaining technologies can now prolong indeterminately the lives of patients in a
persistent vegetative state (PVS). However, where the assistance rendered is not expected to restore
consciousness, they are considered futile from a medical perspective. English law, in such a scenario,
has taken the view that it is not in the best interests of the patient to continue to receive medical
intervention. This makes it lawful to discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and medical support
measures including the termination of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH). The
withdrawal of such apparatus, which is classified as medical treatment, is deemed as an omission
rather than negligence or an act which causes death. In light of this, the law holds that doctors are
merely allowing such patients to die a natural death rather than bringing about their death. The
medical debate on the matter, which is underpinned by a series of intertwined medico-legal concepts
which justify the English Law position, is often considered as settled. The UK Court of Protection was
nevertheless recently asked to resolve a conflict between the family of a Muslim PVS patient who
objected to his doctors’ intention to withhold resuscitation or ventilation should there be a life-
threatening event on the grounds that such measures would be futile and thereby not in the patient’s
best interests. The family instead insisted that all steps should be taken to preserve the patient’s life
until such time that God takes it away. This paper seeks to discuss how such medical futility or at least
the semantic conceptual landscape (which also includes best interests, omissions and medical
treatment) that determines the legal position is dealt with under Islamic Law with a view to assess its
compatibility with English Law. Some of the key questions that the article will consider as part of the
above will be: does Islam allow all medical interventions, including CANH to be withdrawn when these
are not expected, by medics, to bring any medical benefit? Or does it instead deem their withdrawal
from such patients, who may still be able to breathe naturally, as an activity which is tantamount to
killing? The work concludes by emphasizing the need for more religiously and culturally sensitive
discussions to take place among medical, legal and religious representatives.
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Healthcare in the United Kingdom (UK), as in many other Western countries, is heavily reliant on
advanced technology after the Second World War. This ranges from sophisticated medical know-how
and devices which assist in the creation of new human lives, to apparatus which help prolong or
preserve the lives of those who would otherwise have died just a few decades ago. While all these may
have enhanced and/or saved the lives of many, some technological interventions have generated
intractable medico-legal dilemmas. One of these relate to patients in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS). The perpetuation of their existence “through a merger of body and machine”1 has given rise to
the controversial question as to whether it is appropriate to continue indefinitely life-sustaining
measures2 since the medical profession is of the view that their prognosis for recovery is
generally poor.
English law was first invited to adjudicate on this matter in the early 1990s in the now seminal case of
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland.3 The House of Lords, then the highest appellate court in England and
Wales,4 ruled that once a diagnosis of PVS is confirmed, all life-sustaining treatment and medical
support designed to keep the patient alive including clinically assisted nutrition and hydration
(CANH)(i.e., the provision of food and water to the patient), could be lawfully withdrawn. This was on
the grounds that it would not be in the patient’s best interests to have his life prolonged given that
those interventions are considered medically futile. In addition, the withdrawal of all these measures
including of CANH, is characterised as a lawful omission of medical treatment rather than the
performance of an act which causes the patient’s death. Although two decades have transpired since
the ruling was passed, these parameters as set up in Bland still govern the legal management of PVS
patients in the UK today.
A recent case which came before the Court of Protection in 20125 nevertheless casts doubt on the
general acceptability of this conceptual framework among some British Muslims. There, the family of a
fifty-five year old Muslim man who was in an apparently vegetative state after suffering a cardiac arrest,
objected to an application made by the Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust for a declaration that it
would not be in his best interests to be offered ventilation or resuscitation if there was a life-threatening
event. The family was vehement that all steps should be taken to preserve life “until God takes it
away”.6 However, the declaration was granted on the established premise that there would not be any
realistic prospect that such treatments could produce any benefit. Given that the ruling implies that the
approach espoused in Bland is to be applied without adjustments to all Muslim PVS patients in the UK,
the natural question that arises is how far are the medico-legal concepts deployed, congruent with
Islamic law?7 This paper seeks to examine the semantic conceptual landscape which determines the
current position under English law and assesses its suitability for the Muslim community in Britain.
The next part of the work takes a close look at the facts of Bland and its legal parameters. We then
outline their subsequent development in the post Human Rights Act 1998 and Mental Capacity Act
2005 era. It will be shown that far from effecting changes, the courts’ interpretation of these Acts have
only served to confirm and crystallise the medico-legal framework established in Bland. Part III will then
examine whether the Bland model which is underpinned by principles like futility, best interests,
medical treatment and omission is compatible with Islamic law. To answer this question, the
significance of this issue to British Muslims at grass roots level will firstly be highlighted. The work will
then provide a general outline of the Sharia framework on end of life decision-making before looking at
the different variants involved in the management of Muslim PVS patients. It will be argued that Islam
takes a fundamentally different perspective on the supposed futility of technological interventions for
PVS patients. Viewing every illness or medical condition as a trial from God, and for which the search
1Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 110 S.Ct.2841, 2883 (1990).
2Bryan Jennett, The Vegetative State: Medical Facts, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas, at ix. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002).
3Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland 1 All ER 821 (1993).
4This court has since been replaced by the UK Supreme Court in 2009.
5A similar case concerning a Muslim PVS patient by the name of Hassan Rasouli is currently awaiting the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Canada, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/12/10/supreme_court_decision_
on_hassan_rasouli_will_clarify_endoflife_medical_decisions.html (last accessed 31 October 2013).
6“Judge backs doctors in Muslim man’s right-to-life case”, BBC News 8 October 2012, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-england-19873175 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
7Regrettably, this case has not yet been reported at the time of writing. We are therefore unable to access and analyse
the legal arguments tendered therein nor examine the ruling issued by Mr Justice Moynihan.
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for cure should not cease prematurely, the withdrawal and withholding of medical interventions from
those patients are only allowed and thus considered in their best interests where there is robust
medical evidence that there is absolutely no hope that they would regain consciousness. In all other
circumstances, continuation of the interventions is either mandatory or debatable depending on the
patient’s ability to breathe independently. Where continuation is mandatory, its cessation would be
sinful and is tantamount to murder. It will be shown that Islam also views CANH differently i.e., as basic
care rather than medical treatment. This would therefore need to be continually provided even in most
circumstances where omission is permissible. Finally, Part IV calls for a way forward that is respectful of
the value system and cultural sensitivity of the Muslim community in Britain.
II. THE LEGAL MANAGEMENT OF PVS PATIENTS
The term “vegetative state” first entered the medical lexicon in 19728 to describe a condition of “being
awake but unaware with no evidence of a working mind”.9 This phenomenon resulted from advances in
life-sustaining technologies, particularly those associated with resuscitation, intensive care and
nourishment, which prevented death from taking place following severe neurological damage to the
brain’s cerebral hemispheres.10 This clinical condition is now described by the Royal College of
Physicians (RCP) as one of “unawareness of self and environment in which the patient breathes
spontaneously, has a stable circulation, and shows cycles of eye closure and opening which may
simulate sleep and waking” that has continued for four weeks or more.11 Such patients are deemed as
permanently unconscious (i.e., a state known as persistent vegetative state) if they have been in that
state for more than six months when the underlying pathology is non-traumatic, or more than twelve
months when the underlying pathology is traumatic injury.12 Notwithstanding their complete
non-engagement with their surrounding environment, it is generally agreed that PVS patients are
medically and legally still alive, since their brain stems remain functioning.13 They are nevertheless
wholly dependent on others for their day-to-day care. Not only that, they rely for their survival on
nasogastric or gastronomy tubes for nutrition; percutaneous endoscopic gastronomy (PEG) tubes for
fluids; and catheters and enemas for the excretion of wastes. Some may even need the assistance of
mechanical ventilators to breathe.
With such help constantly in place, PVS patients can continue to survive for many years. Indeed, one
of the longest known sufferers is Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse from India who is reported to have been in
this state for over forty years, since 1973.14 One of the most high profile sufferers, Ariel Sharon, the
former Prime Minister of Israel, too has been in this condition for over seven years at the time of writing,
since 2006.15 At the beginning of 2013, it was reported that he showed significant brain activity when
presented with pictures of his family and when doctors had him listen to his son’s voice.16 This
development has given rise to hopes that he will one day wake.17 In general, however, the medical
profession has not expressed optimism about vegetative patients’ prognosis for regaining
consciousness if they are in this condition for over twelve months and especially over forty years of
age.18 Thus, when the media occasionally announces cases of adult PVS patients waking up after being
8Andrew Grubb, et al., Reporting on the Persistent Vegetative State in Europe, 6(2) Med. L. Rev., 161 (1998).
9Bryan Jennett, supra n. 2, at ix.
10Id.; Kenneth Mitchell, et al., Medical Futility, Treatment Withdrawal and the Persistent Vegetative State, 19 J. Med.
Ethics 71, 74 (1993).
11Royal College of Physicians, The Vegetative State: Guidance on Diagnosis and Management, 1–2 (2003).
12Id. 5.
13See Diagnosis of Death: Memorandum Issued by the Honorary Secretary of the Conference of Medical Royal Colleges
and their Faculties in the United Kingdom on 15 January 1979, 1 Brit. Med. J. 332 (1979); Re A (A Minor), 3 Med. L. Rev. 303
(1992); R v. Malcherek, R v. Steel 1 WLR 690 (1981); Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, A Code of Practice for the Diagnosis
and Confirmation of Death, 11 (2008).
14“India Court Rejects Aruna Shanbaug Euthanasia Plea”, BBC News South Asia 7 March 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-south-asia-12662124 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
15“Ariel Sharon: Israeli Ex-PM in Coma ‘Has Brain Activity’” BBC News Middle East, 27 Jan. 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-middle-east-21225929 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
16Ashley Fantz & Jethro Mullen, “Significant Brain Activity” in Comatose Ariel Sharon, available at http://edition.cnn.
com/2013/01/28/world/mesat/israel-sharon-brain-activity, 28 Jan. 2013 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
17Id.
18The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS,Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State 330 New Eng. J. of Med., 1572
(1994); Cheryl Arenella, Coma and Persistent Vegetative State: an Exploration of Terms, available at http://www.american
hospice.org/articles-mainmenu-8/caregiving-mainmenu-10/50-coma-and-persistent-vegetative-state-an-explorati
on-of-terms (last accessed 31 October 2013).
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in this state for several years,19 doctors have either explained these as incidents where the initial
diagnoses of PVS were mistaken,20 or dismissed them pejoratively as “miracles”.21 In all other cases,
they claimed that death would eventually occur either through one or a combination of the following:
pressure sores, chest infections, pneumonia, deep-vein thrombosis that develops into pulmonary
embolus, kidney failure and other related complications.22
If the medical profession is of the view that the chance of recovery after being in a vegetative state for
more than twelve months is remote,23 should life-sustaining interventions be continued until the
patient dies naturally from one or more of those complications? Or, is it legally acceptable to cease and
withdraw those interventions before that moment arrives? This article now turns to the House of Lords’
response to these questions in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland.24 It then examines the judicial and
statutory developments that have since taken place.
A. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland
The case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland25 concerned a football fan by the name of Anthony Bland who
was tragically caught in the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster on the 15th April 1989.26 His lungs
were crushed and punctured, and his brain was starved of oxygen. As a result, he suffered catastrophic
and irreversible damage to the higher centres of his brain, which left him in a persistent vegetative
state since April 1989. He was then only seventeen years of age. After being in this condition for over
three years, and when all the doctors who had been consulted about the case were in agreement that
there was no hope of any improvement or recovery, his family and doctors decided that all medical
interventions which were sustaining his life should come to an end. The hospital where he was being
treated, the Airedale NHS Trust, therefore sought declarations from the court that they might:
“i) lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and medical support measures designed to
keep [him] alive in his existing persistent vegetative state including the termination of
ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial means; and
ii) lawfully discontinue and thereafter need not furnish medical treatment to [him] except for the
sole purpose of enabling [him] to end his life and die peacefully with the greatest dignity and
the least of pain, suffering and distress.”27
In granting the declarations, the House of Lords ruled that since the purpose of medical treatment
and care was to benefit the patient, the principle of sanctity of life was not violated by the cessation of
such interventions even though it would lead to the inevitable death of Anthony Bland within a week or
two. It was held that it would not be in his “best interests” to have his life prolonged by the continuance
of such forms of treatment and care which were not conferring any therapeutic benefit to him.28
Any interventions were thereby deemed useless and it was the futility of this which was said to justify
their termination.29
Given the circumstances, his doctors would no longer be under a duty to treat him where a
responsible and competent body of the medical profession agrees with them that no benefit at all is
19E.g., Terry Wallis (aged 39) who woke up after 19 years; Don Herbert (aged 43) who woke up after 10 years; Christa Lilly
(aged 49) who woke up after 6 years; and Evie Branan (aged 79) who woke up after 5 years. See e.g., The Big Sleep: Terry
Wallis, at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1864940_1864939_1864908,00.html (last
accessed 31 October 2013); After Decade in Coma, Just 10 Months Awake, at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/02/21/coma.
death/ (last accessed 31 October 2013); Brief Awakening for US Coma Woman, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ameri
cas/6435949.stm (last accessed 31 October 2013); Evie Branan, 79, Wakes from 5-Year Coma and Asks to go to Bob Seger
Concert, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/evie-branan-bob-seger-coma_n_3047399.html (last accessed 31
October 2013).
20Joseph Fins, Brain Injury: The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, in Hastings Center, From Birth to Death and
Bench to Clinic: The Hastings Center Bioethics Briefing Book for Journalists, Policymakers, and Campaigns (New York: The
Hastings Center, 2008), 15.
21Richard Luscombe, Awake for Only 12 Days This Century – “Miracle” of Coma Woman, The Guardian 9 March 2007, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/09/usa.hyrichardluscombe (last accessed 31 October 2013).
22Peter Alldridge & Derek Morgan, Ending Life, 142 New L. J., 1536 (1992).
23Martin Monti, The Vegetative State, 341 Brit. Med. J., c3765 (2010).
24Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, 1 All ER 821 (1993).
25Id.
26For detailed information about the incident, see Home Office, “The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster”, 15 April 1989,
Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor: Interim Report (1989), at 4–46.
27Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, 1 All ER 821, 822–823.
28Per Lord Goff at 868.
29Id. 869.
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conferred by their continuation.30 This endorsement of the Bolam test31 as the basis for the decision to
discontinue the interventions thereby proclaimed doctors as the determinants of “futility” and renders
medical opinion fundamental to determinations of “best interests”.32 Once they have so decided, no
crime is committed when they remove all life-sustaining treatment and subsequently withhold further
medical support. These would constitute mere “omissions” and are not considered the cause of the
patient’s death. Rather, the patient is returned to the position he was in when he was first admitted to
hospital and it was his natural condition which led to his death.33
The House of Lords added that a declaration needs to be sought from the court whenever a doctor
decides to withdraw the life-sustaining treatment from a PVS patient in the future. Although this offered
a procedural safeguard that could help ensure that such monumental decisions are not the sole
province of doctors,34 it would appear that this is but a rubber-stamping exercise by the judiciary.35 As
developments in the post-Bland era shows, once the doctors have agreed that the treatment is
medically futile, judges have not been hesitant to find that withdrawal and withholding of treatment to
be in the patient’s best interests, thereby lawful. Thus court approval, though mandatory,36 is nothing
more than a mere formality.37
B. Post-Bland developments
1. Statute
In the twenty years since the Bland ruling was issued, two relevant statutes were passed by Parliament:
the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It will be seen that based on their
interpretations by the courts, neither one has made a noticeable difference to the medico-legal
framework set up in the case.
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000. In NHS Trust A v. Mrs M, NHS Trust B v. Mrs H38
and later confirmed in Re G (adult incompetent: withdrawal of treatment)39 and A Hospital v. SW,40 the
courts made it clear that the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures from PVS patients, including CANH,
is not incompatible with Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As regards
Article 2 (the right to life), it was claimed that the analysis in Bland was entirely consistent with both the
negative and positive obligations embedded within the Article. It was opined that the deprivation of life
referred to therein must import a deliberate act, as opposed to an “omission”, by someone acting on
behalf of the State which culminates in death. A responsible decision by the medical profession to
withdraw or withhold treatment was not therefore considered to be tantamount to an intentional
deprivation of life by the State. As regards the State’s positive obligation under the Article to take
adequate and appropriate steps to safeguard life, it was averred that this obligation is discharged
where the medical profession’s decision to withhold treatment is made: on the grounds that it is
not in the patient’s best interests and in accordance with the practice of a respectable body of
medical opinion.
30Per Lord Keith at 858–859 and Lord Goff at 870.
31I.e., the principle that arose from the case of Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee 1 WLR 582 (1957), which
states that a doctor is not negligent if he was acting in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible
body of the medical profession.
32Andrea Fenwick, Applying Best Interests to Persistent Vegetative State – A Principled Distortion? 24 J. Med. Ethics 86
at 87 (1998).
33For a critique of the House of Lords’ reasoning, see e.g., Sheila McLean, Human Rights and the Patient in a Persistent
Vegetative State 19 Int’l Legal Prac., 19 (1994); John Keown, The Legal Revolution: from “Sanctity of Life” to “Quality of
Life”and “Autonomy” (1997–1998) 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y, 253 (1997–1998); John Harris, Consent and End of Life
Decisions, 29 J. of M. Ethics 10 (2003); Jenny McEwan, Murder by Design: the “Feel-Good Factor” and the Criminal Law,
9(3) Med. L. Rev. 246 (2001).
34Julie Stone, Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment: the Ultimate Decision, 144 New L. J., 205 (1994).
35Kristina Stern, Withdrawing Medical Treatment and the PVS Patient (1993–1994) 4 King’s College L. J., 114, 118
(1993–1994); Penney Lewis,Withdrawal of Treatment from a Patient in a Permanent Vegetative State: Judicial Involvement
and Innovative Treatment 15(3) Med. L. Rev. 392 (2007).
36Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and Welfare Decision for Adults Who Lack Capacity)
2 FLR 373 (2006).
37Emily Jackson, The Minimally Conscious State and Treatment Withdrawal: W v. M, J. of Med. Ethics, doi:
10.1136/medethics-2012-100981 (2012).
38NHS Trust A v. Mrs M, NHS Trust B v. Mrs H, 2 WLR 942 (2001).
39Re G (Adult Incompetent: Withdrawal of Treatment), 65 BMLR 6 (2002).
40A Hospital v. SW, EWHC 425 (Fam) (2007).
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The courts similarly held that no contravention of Article 3 (the right not to be subjected to torture or
inhuman and degrading treatment) exists. Where it might be argued that death by starvation and
dehydration as caused by the withdrawal of CANH is inhuman and degrading,41 it was asserted that
since the Article requires the victim to be aware of the inhuman and degrading treatment which he/she
is experiencing, the Article does not apply to PVS patients. This is because, they are not believed to be
able to feel or appreciate what is happening (i.e., they are insensate or in a state of non-awareness).42
Thus the Human Rights Act 1998 was interpreted as being compatible with the principles established
in Bland.
The Bland model was also not affected by the need to now assess best interests within the
framework of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This Act, which came into force in October 2007, now
governs decisions relating to patients who lack capacity. As it was designed to promote autonomy,
doctors are expected to firstly ascertain whether the patient has, while competent, made an advance
decision that he/she would not want life-sustaining treatment and medical support to be carried out or
continued should he/she find him/herself incompetent to make that decision in the future.43 If an
advance decision is present, doctors need to comply with the wishes of the person. It is important
to note that although the Act provides for anticipatory decisions, this only refers to refusal of treatment.
The patient or his/her family cannot therefore demand nor insist on the continuation of life-sustaining
treatment through this mechanism.44 This includes CANH since it is categorised as medical treatment.
If no advance decision has been made, the Act states that any decision made for or on behalf
of a person who lacks capacity must be made in his best interests.45 In deciding best interests, the
2005 Act expects several factors to be considered.46 These include, so far as reasonably ascertainable,
the patient’s past wishes and feelings; beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision
if he had capacity; and any other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to.47
Account must also be taken of the views of others including those caring for him/her and those who are
interested in his/her welfare.48 The Act therefore incorporates a wider remit rather than just the
clinical aspects of determining best interests.49 It requires the informal statements made in
the past which represented the once-autonomous patients’ wishes, to be balanced against the
contemporaneous welfare interests of the now incapacitated person. The two can, however, contradict
one another.50
A “best interests” decision is as objective a test as possible of what would be in the person’s actual
best interests, having taken all relevant factors into account.51 This can be contrasted to the
“substituted judgement” test used in the USA.52 There, the decision-maker would determine what
decision the patient would have him/herself made were he/she able to decide, as ascertained through
a detailed inquiry into the patient’s views and preferences (i.e., the hypothetical wishes of the
incapable patient53). The decision can then be made exclusively on the basis of what the now
41Anna Nowarska, To Feed or Not to Feed? Clinical Aspects of Withholding and Withdrawing Food and Fluids at the End
of Life, 10 Advances in Palliative Med. 3, 4 (2011).
42As Dame Butler-Sloss P. put it in NHS Trust A v. Mrs M, NHS Trust B v. Mrs H, “[a]n insensate patient suffering from
persistent vegetative state has no feelings and no comprehension of the treatment accorded to him or her” – at
paragraph 49.
43Sections 24-26.
44This is consistent with the scope of self-determination whilst alive, whereby one can refuse a proposed treatment
however irrational the decision may seem to others, yet this does not extend to requests for treatment – see e.g., St.
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S, 3 All ER 673 (1998); Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment), 4 All ER 649 (1992); and
Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment), 2 All ER 449 (2002).




49Alexandra Mullock, Deciding the Fate of a Minimally Conscious Patient: an Unsatisfactory Balancing Act?, 20(3) Med.
L. Rev. 460 (2012).
50Mary Donnelly, Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 17(1) Med. L. Rev., 1, 2 (2009).
51Julian Sheather, Should We Respect Precedent Autonomy in Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions?, J. Med. Ethics,
doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100663 (2012).
52Note that the choice of using best interests, rather than substituted judgment, in the Act was a deliberate one - see
Brenda Hale, Mental Health Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2010), p. 66.
53Marc Stauch, & Kay Wheat, Text, Cases and Materials on Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2011)
p. 595; Emma Keane, Withdrawal of Life-Support for Patients in PVS, Medico-Legal J. of Ireland 83 (2011).
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incapacitated person would have wished.54 It is therefore a subjective test which is more respectful of
the patient’s precedent autonomy.55 The best interests judgement, on the other hand, whilst now
needing to incorporate past wishes hence giving some respect to the person’s previous autonomy,
balances this against more objective contemporaneous welfare or experiential interests.56
In the case of PVS patients, the way this judgement has been used in the post-Mental Capacity Act
2005 era tends to place equal or more emphasis on the incapacitated individual’s current welfare.57
Once the diagnosis is confirmed and doctors have decided that the provision of any treatment is futile,
even if the patient’s prior wishes and values, or that of his/her relatives are for a different response
(i.e., for continuation of life-sustaining treatment), these are neither determinative nor allowed by the
courts to operate as a veto.58
2. Case law
The manner in which the provisions of the 1998 and 2005 Acts were interpreted has not only endorsed,
but fortified, the medico-legal framework established in Bland. It has also enabled this framework to
incorporate other complexities associated with the care of PVS patients which the case itself did not
have the opportunity to address.59 It will be recalled that the case dealt specifically with the withdrawal
of CANH and thereafter with the withholding of further interventions from a patient who was taken care
of in a hospital setting. It also referred to the withdrawal of artificial ventilation even though this was
not directly in issue as Anthony Bland was able to breathe unaided. Further, his family agreed
unanimously with his doctors that all life-sustaining treatment should cease.
Subsequent cases have shown that courts have likewise been willing to declare lawful the
withdrawal of CANH and other life-sustaining treatment from PVS patients taken care of in nursing
homes60 or specialist nursing homes.61 They have also been willing to make the declaration where
there was disagreement among the PVS patients’ family members.62 They have even done so
in situations where the patients’ entire family63 or team of carers64 were vehemently opposed to the
doctors’ proposal to stop all life-sustaining medical treatment.65 In fact, courts were also prepared to
authorise doctors not to replace gastronomy tubes that had become accidentally dislodged from the
patient’s stomach66 as well as those which had been obstructed and could not be unblocked.67
Further, they have pronounced as lawful, attempts not to offer resuscitation to such patients in
response to life-threatening events like breathing failure or cardiac arrest.68 Controversially, courts
have even entertained the possibility of dispensing altogether with the need to seek a declaration of
lawfulness in cases of acute emergencies where a decision to cease life-sustaining treatment has to be
made within a matter of minutes or hours.69
Thus, whether the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures was a considered decision or one forced by
events; whether the decision was supported or opposed by the patient’s family or carers; whether the
PVS patient was taken care of in a hospital setting or in a nursing home; whether the proposed
54Mary Donnelly, Determining Best Interests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 19(2) Med. L. Rev., 304 (2011).
55Julian Sheather, Withdrawing and Withholding Artificial Nutrition and Hydration from Patients in a Minimally
Conscious State: Re M and its Repercussions, J. Med. Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100662 (2012).
56Id.
57Id.
58Kenyon Mason & Graeme Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) p. 509.
59Owing to the need to stay close to the factual situation which was then before the court.
60A Primary Care Trust, An NHS Trust v. Mr CW (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor), HW (Mother), PW (Father),
AW (Brother), EW (Sister), EWHC 3448 (Fam) (2010).
61The NHS Trust v. AW (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), EWHC 78 (COP) (2013).
62Re G, 3 Med. L. Rev. 80 (1995).
63E.g., An NHS Trust v. D, EWHC 2439 (Fam) (2005).
64A Primary Care Trust, An NHS Trust v. Mr CW (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor), HW (Mother), PW (Father),
AW (Brother), EW (Sister), EWHC 3448 (Fam) (2010).
65Note, however, that these objections were not made on religious grounds. Nor were they argued on the basis that the
patients themselves would have wanted the medical interventions to continue were they able to communicate their
wishes. The circumstances in the aforementioned 2012 Court of Protection case are therefore distinguishable and
unprecedented.
66Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S, 2 All ER 403 (1994).
67Swindon and Marlborough NHS Trust v. S, 3 Med. L. Rev., 84 (1995).
68An NHS Trust v. D, EWHC 2439 (Fam) (2005).
69Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S, 2 All ER 403 per Bingham MR (1994).
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withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining measures relate to the patient’s current situation or in
anticipation of a life-threatening event in the future; declarations of lawfulness have been forthcoming.
Bland and post-Bland cases have demonstrated that where doctors have confirmed the diagnosis of
PVS, this automatically leads to the conclusion that CANH and other life-sustaining measures are
“futile”.70 The courts have correspondingly never been hesitant to declare that it is indeed in the “best
interests” of those patients to have those support removed or withheld. There is, in other words, only
one set of response applied to the condition.
III. THE (BRITISH) MUSLIM COMMUNITY’S PERSPECTIVE ON PVS
The discussion thus far raises some very important questions for faith communities in Britain, whose
ethico-religious frameworks impose a value system to be considered as part of the application or
omission of technology. One such community is the Muslim community. Numbering approximately
2.7 million71 and consisting of diverse cultures and ethnicities,72 it is mainly located in the North West,
Yorkshire, the Midlands and London.73 Many within the community settled in the UK after the Second
World War on the back of changes within immigration policies.74 Its claims for public recognition has
seen the Muslim UK resident allowed access to halal food, Muslim Schools, sharia-based finance
packages, circumcision clinics and burial areas.75 In addition, there are no legal restrictions placed on
the observance of religious attire and duties in the workplace, nor on the construction or setting up of
Mosques. UK charity law has also offered the same exemptions to religious buildings and
organizations as for other faiths. Further, a seasonal Hajj consulate has been established for British
pilgrims, making this a unique development in the western hemisphere.76
The secular UK landscape has undoubtedly been embracive and accommodating of community
needs within the fabric of British society. However, this has also attracted intra-community debate and
a plethora of opinions on finer points regarding some of the issues highlighted in the preceding
paragraph. Notwithstanding this,77 it has made “living Islam” (i.e., living according to Islamic principles)
in the UK a reality for the Muslim domicile. This is perhaps to an even larger degree than in some
countries where the majority population is Muslim where such liberal accommodation of faith views is
not witnessed. Although there may well be a range of both community and scholarly opinions on a
variety of issues concerning the UK Muslim community, there is also a growing consensus of opinion
on the more generic areas. This has facilitated adjustment to public policy to meet the needs of the
Muslim community.
Given that healthcare in the UK has been significantly revolutionised after the Second World War, and
how the British society itself has diversified and become very multi-faith during this period,78 the
70Kenyon Mason & Graeme Laurie, supra n. 58, at 510. The fact that it is highly related to the diagnosis is particularly
clear when PVS is contrasted to MCS (minimally conscious state). In MCS, even where the patient’s chance of recovery may
be negligible (hence treatment would not bring about recovery, thereby equally “futile”), courts did not sanction the
withdrawal of CANH – see W v. M, EWHC 2443 (Fam.) (2011). For discussion, see, Emily Jackson, supra n. 37; Carolyn
Johnston, The Weight Attributed to Patient Values in Determining Best Interests, J. Med. Ethics, doi: 10.1136/medethics-
2012-100916 (2012); Richard Huxtable, “In a Twilight World? Judging the Value of Life for the Minimally Conscious Patient,
J. Med. Ethics, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-101028 (2012); Walter Glannon, Burdens of ANH Outweigh Benefits in the
Minimally Conscious State, J. Med. Ethics, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100882 (2013).
71Office for National Statistics, Religion in England and Wales 2011, available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp/
171776_290510.pdf (last accessed 31 October 2013).
72Leon Moosavi,Why Has the Number of Muslims in the UK Risen So Much?, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.
uk/dr-leon-moosavi/why-has-the-number-of-mus_b_2279610.html?utm_hp_ref¼ tw (last accessed 31 October 2013).
73Muhammad Anwar, Muslims in Britain: Demographic and Socio-Economic Position, in Aziz Sheikh and Abdul Rashid
Gatrad (eds.), Caring for Muslim Patients (Oxford: Radcliffe Medical Press Ltd, 2000), 9.
74Id., 4; Shane Brighton, British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: “Integration” and “Cohesion” in and
beyond the State 83(1) Int’l Aff., 1, 12 (2007).
75Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Tyler Golson, Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of “Moderate
Islam” in Western Europe, 49 J. of Church and St. 487, 507–511 (2007); Tariq Modood & Stephen May,Multiculturalism and
Education in Britain: an Internally Contested Debate, 35 Int’l J. of Educ. Res., 305, 310 (2001); Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim Law
in Britain: Reflections in the Socio-Legal Sphere and Differential Legal Treatment, 20(2) J. of Muslim Minority Aff., 353,
355 (2000).
76British Foreign Office launches special British Hajj delegation to Makkah, available at http://www.paktribune.com/
news/print.php?id¼161576 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
77These differences in opinion are of course accepted within Islamic law provided the jurists have been compliant with
the sources of Islamic law in their methodology and independent reasoning.
78Abdul Rashid Gatrad & Aziz Sheikh, Medical Ethics and Islam: Principles and Practice, 84 Archives of Disease in
Childhood 72 (2001).
Page 8 of 15
Choong and Chandia. International Review of Law 2013:9
discussion regarding the application of the conceptual medico-legal framework regarding medical
futility and the Muslim patient seems a logical extension of this discourse on the accommodation of
migrant communities within a secular but multi-faith Britain. This is so, irrespective of minor
disagreements within communities and followers of different schools of thought. The issues mentioned
earlier, enlisted as part of public recognition, focus on “loyalty to faith” whilst alive. Whereas, the
medical futility debate focuses on loyalty to faith whilst dying. This precarious balance in life and death
issues; between societal values and faith-based community values; or from an Islamic legal sense, text
and context; is tentatively achieved in the areas identified above, making living Islam a possibility. This
allows the Muslim domicile a profound sense of British identity and faith loyalty. The medical futility
discourse, if sensitively addressed, can facilitate a similar redress. In tackling the issue, this part of the
work firstly outlines the epistemology of Islamic law before exploring the management of PVS patients
from an Islamic perspective.
A. The Sharia on end of life decision-making
In the UK, as in many other countries, governance (within institutions or regarding medical intervention)
around death poses many an ethical impasse for both carers and the cared. For the Muslim, the Islamic
thought framework plays a very important role on end of life healthcare decision-making just as it does
during life. It is necessary to acquaint oneself with this framework in order to assess the experience of
the Muslim patient and how to sensitively address any issues.
These issues within Islamic thought would be broadly located within the science of fiqh
(jurisprudence) or human interpretations or extrapolations of God’s law (Sharia).79 Fiqh scholars, in
their efforts to understand God’s law, have classified human welfare into three distinct hierarchical
categories: necessities, needs and embellishments.80 Necessities would be primarily prioritised at
a time of conflict, while embellishments would merit the least priority. The first category is founded
on a set of preservatory principles:81 the preservation of religion, life, intellect, property, and
genealogy/honour.82
Fiqh governs an individual’s private and public life in all areas, ranging from: sincerity of intent,
personal hygiene, ritual observance, family life, neighbourly conduct, promoting human welfare,
commerce and mercantile life, hunting, marriage, divorce, inheritance, bequest, burial procedure, etc.,
as well as societal governance and public administration.83 Sharia law also classifies actions into a
broad (value) range of being mandatory, recommended, permissible, disliked, and forbidden.84 This
gives value to the present discussion of understanding medical futility as it gives hierarchical
importance to seeking medical treatment in different situations.
The framework in academic terms could be referred to as the epistemology of Islamic thought and
behaviour (also referred to as usul al fiqh). It, in essence, is how decisions are finalised and
observances and practices are based upon (the legal methodology). This framework, based on the
Qur‘an, also guides behaviour and thought on end of life decision- making. It is based on primary and
secondary sources. The primary sources are the Qur‘an and the Hadith (Prophetic traditions). Both are
seen as forms of revelation and as such, highly revered and respected. The secondary sources are the
consensus of scholarly opinion and analogical deduction.85 The secondary sources or at least recourse
to them are activated upon the absence of guidance within the primary sources. But, even then, the
decision must be based on an effective cause within the primary sources.
79For an in-depth discussion, see Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and Elements, 1(1) J. of
Islamic L., 1 (1996).
80Saeed al-Harbi, Fiqh al-muwazanah wa hajat al-Imam wa al-khatib lahu at http://uqu.edu.sa/files2/tiny_mce/plugi
ns/filemanager/files/4230042/feqh_almowaznah.pdf (last accessed 31 October 2013) & Yusuf Qaradawi, Fiqh
al-muwazanah at http://www.qaradawi.net/library/66/3269.html, 4 (last accessed 31 October 2013).
81For an in-depth discussion on the preservatory principles seeMuhammad Hashim Kamali,Maqasid al-Shari’ah Made
Simple, Occasional Paper Series 13, The International Institute of Islamic Thought (2008); Jasser Auda,Maqasid al-Shariah:
A Beginner’s Guide, Occasional Paper Series 14, The International Institute of Islamic Thought (2008); and Muhammad
Umar Chapra, The Islamic Vision of Development in Light of Maqasid al-Shariah Occasional Paper Series 15, The
International Institute of Islamic Thought (2008).
82Shahid Athar, Enhancement Technologies and the Person: an Islamic View, 36 J. of L., Med. and Ethics 59, 61 (2008).
83Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Thought: An Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 44–45.
84Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 40.
85Andrew Rippin,Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 92-93 and Patrick Glenn,
Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 159–162.
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Further, any discussion on the application or omission of technology at the end of life must consider
a set of further concepts as part of the above framework: the concept of sanctity of human life within
Islam, view on illness, concept of the human as a trustee of his/her body, view on seeking medical
treatment and the definition of death and its determinants. The consideration of these values can
greatly assist to determine the delineation between medical futility and medical expedience, at least
from an Islamic perspective.
In fiqh terms, this debate is located within the discourse of termination of life by the cessation or
withholding of medical care, or omission of life support systems. The preservatory principle concerned
is the protection of life. For this, it is important to observe that Islam places a premium on the sanctity
of life.86 It is for this reason that suicide,87 physician-assisted death and voluntary euthanasia are
strictly forbidden in Islam.88 It is believed that each person’s longevity is only known by God and the
exact timing of death is the sole prerogative of God.89 Human beings, as embodied souls, are mere
trustees rather than owners of their bodies. As such, they are placed under an obligation to take good
care of this physical entity which has been entrusted to them. When the body is afflicted with an illness
or an accident, it becomes incumbent upon the Muslim to seek treatment, and to persevere in this
search for a cure.90 In this endeavour, they are reminded by the Hadith that no disease is sent by God
except He has sent a cure for it.91 This statement is taken literally and is seen as a clear encouragement
to seek and research cures for illnesses. Hence, they should not give up hope on the grounds that no
apparent improvement is discernible.92
Thus, despite the fact that pain and suffering caused by illness are deemed as predestined,93 by the
permission of God,94 a test of faith from God95 and the forbearance of which could lead to the
expiation of one’s sins,96 this does not discount in any way the need to make every effort to relieve
one’s suffering.97 Arguably this, by extension, advocates the view that treatment is never futile in
Islamic thought, until of course the patient is indisputably dead. Such a position would render
problematic the whole concept of futility on which Bland rests.98
The Quran also reminds Muslims in three places that each soul shall taste death99 and it is the
extraction of the soul by God which ultimately determines death.100 Although the precise moment of
when this happens is not made clear by the Quran, many Muslim scholars now accept brain stem death
as the definition of death.101 Since brain stem dead patients are unable to breathe independently and
would have no heartbeat without the assistance of medical technology, some Islamic legal experts
allow for the mechanical ventilator and other life-sustaining measures to be discontinued on the
grounds that the individual has died and the soul has departed.102 An analogous consideration into
86Kamyar Hedayat & Roya Pirzadeh, Issues in Islamic Biomedical Ethics: a Primer for the Pediatrician, 108 Pediatrics
965 at 970 (2001).
87Qur’an, Surah Al-Baqarah verse 195 and Surah Al-Nisa verse 29.
88According to the Qur’an Surah Al-Maidah verse 32, “taking a single life is tantamount to killing all of mankind”.
See also Ajit Shah and Mahmood Chandia, The Relationship between Suicide and Islam: a Cross-National Study, 2(2) J. of
Inj. and Violence Res. available at http://jivresearch.org/jivr/index.php/jivr/article/view/60 (2010) (last accessed
31 October 2013).
89Mohammad Zafir Al-Shahri & Abdullah Al-Khenaizan, Palliative Care for Muslim Patients, 3 J. of Supportive Oncology
432, 435.
90Id., 432.
91Sahih Al-Bukhari, The Book of Medicine, vol. 7, chapter 1, hadith number 582, p. 395 (in The Translation of Meanings
of Sahih Al-Bukhari (Arabic-English) by Muhammad Muhsin Khan published by Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, n.d).
92Abdul Rashid Gatrad & Aziz Sheikh, Palliative Care for Muslims and Issues Before Death, 8(11) Int. J. Palliat Nurs. 526,
528 (2002).
93Qur‘an Surah Al-Hadid verse 22.
94Qur‘an Surah Al-Taghabun verse 11.
95Qur‘an Surah Al-Baqarah verse 155 and Surah Al-Ankabut verse 1.
96Sahih Al-Bukhari, The Book of Patients, vol. 7, chapter 1, hadith number 544, p. 371 (in The Translation of Meanings of
Sahih Al-Bukhari (Arabic-English) by Muhammad Muhsin Khan published by Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, n.d).
97Mohammad Zafir Shahri & Abdullah Al-Khenaizan, supra n. 89, at 432.
98See the discussion in Part III.B below.
99Qur’an Surah Al-Imran verse 185, Surah Al-Anbiya verse 35 and Surah Al-Ankabut verse 57.
100Qur’an Surah Al-Zumar verse 42.
101See e.g., UK’s Muslim Law Council Approves Organ Transplants, 22 J. of Med. Ethics 99 (1996); Declaration of the
Academy of Islamic Jurisprudence; Faroque Khan, Religious Teachings and Reflections on Advance Directive: Religious
Values and Legal Dilemmas in Bioethics; an Islamic Perspective, 30(1) Fordham Urb. L.J. 267 (2002); Abdullah Al-Khader,
The Iranian Transplant Programme: Comment from an Islamic Perspective, 17 Nephrol Dial Transplant 213 (2002).
102Kamyar Hedayat & Roya Pirzadeh, supra n. 86, at 969.
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whether the souls of PVS patients have already been taken or not, has not emerged. But, can
life-sustaining measures, including CANH, be similarly discontinued for Muslim PVS patients?
B. An exploration into the management of Muslim PVS patients
In exploring the management of PVS patients from an Islamic perspective, it is important to firstly
highlight that CANH is generally considered as basic care.103 This is because, nutrition and fluids are
the essentials for maintaining life.104 There are a number of variant scenarios as to whether these and
other life-sustaining and life-saving measures could be withdrawn and withheld. The variants,
presented in diagrammatic form, are as follows:
Referring to the above (Figure 1),
1. Where an individual (Patient One) is able to breathe independently and there is a normal heart beat
without any technological aid (as in most PVS cases), omission would not be allowed given the
absence of any imminent danger on human life.
2. Where an individual (Patient Two) is only able to breathe and has a heartbeat because he is
supported by medical technology but he is not brain stem dead, omission is debatable in this
scenario. The debate will revolve on the question: when is medical treatment necessary? The
answer to this question is subject to further permutations.
2.1. If the administration of food, fluids and any other life-sustaining and life-saving treatment
would lead to cure (consciousness) and the lack thereof would lead to death, then the
administration would be mandatory (i.e., otherwise a sin) and omission would not be allowed.
2.2. If life-sustaining and life-saving medical treatment would lead to probable, rather than certain
cure, then it should be undertaken but it is not mandatory (i.e., not otherwise sinful). Fluids
and nutritional support (CANH) must nevertheless continue to be administered as these are
basic care.105
When deliberating on the situations in 2.1 and 2.2, it is important to remember that
our earlier discussion in Part II implied that the medical profession is merely pessimistic,
Figure 1. Management of Muslim PVS patients.
103Sami Al-Solamy, Islamic Views on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in Terminally Ill Patients, Bioethics,
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01996.x (2012).
104Id.
105Faroque Khan, supra n. 101, at 271.
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as opposed to convinced, that PVS patients can never recover consciousness. After all,
as highlighted, there have been cases where patients regained consciousness after
numerous years of being in this condition. Although the medical profession may have
dismissed these as cases of wrong diagnoses or inexplicable “miracles”, these
phenomena not only raise doubts on the hopelessness of any given situation, they
also correspond to the Islamic worldview that treatment is never futile until the patient
is definitely dead. As for the distinction drawn under Islamic law between situations
where life-sustaining treatment “would lead to cure” (2.1) and “would lead to
probable cure” (2.2), it is arguable that the former is more relevant for patients who
have been in a vegetative state for 12 months or less, or not too many months or years
after the first 12 months. The latter refers to those who have been in this condition
substantially longer.
2.3. If life-sustaining and life-saving medical treatment would not lead to any realistic cure,
then omission would be permissible106 although attempting to cure would be better. As
above, fluids and nutritional support must nevertheless continue to be administered until
death occurs.107
2.4. If the administration of food, fluids and life-sustaining and life-saving medical treatment
is futile (i.e., beyond any reasonable doubt that it will not lead to recovery of
consciousness)108 based on robust medical evidence, then omission would not be
disliked (i.e., allowed).109
The situations described in 2.3 and 2.4, could be distinguished from those in 2.2 by reference to the
severity of the patient’s condition. So, if for example the patient’s brain was liquefied at the moment
when the case was deliberated on, thereby strongly indicative that restoration of consciousness is
highly unlikely,110 this could be grounds for engaging 2.3 or 2.4, rather than 2.2.
It is necessary to note that there are also four other sub-permutations to consider in the event of the
omission allowance mentioned in 2.4:
2.4.1. If the omission is attributable to complacency or even negligence rather than medical need,
then it is not allowed as the human body is seen as a trust and its safeguarding is necessary.
2.4.2. If the omission is with the intent of fast-tracking death, then it is also not allowed as this
would be tantamount to the de-sanctification and killing-off of a human life as well as a
compromise of a Quranic principle and a preservatory principle of the Sharia namely the
protection of life.111
2.4.3. If the omission takes place in the absence of any hope of recovery and is based on robust
medical evidence rather than to simply fast-track death, then it would not be seen as
tantamount to murder.112 Since medical cure is not definitive in such circumstances, omi-
ssion will not be prohibited.113
2.4.4. However, medical assistance is always theoretically encouraged (but not necessarily ma-
ndatory) in every scenario. If patient autonomy is lacking within the decision-making process
(i.e., medical opinion outweighs the wishes of the patient or his/her family) and the
technology sustaining life is withdrawn, then the patient would not be held responsible. This
is based on the Islamic viewpoint discussed above that for every illness there is a cure
except death. Thus, the pursuit of a cure will always be laudable.
106Michael Schultz et al., Reflections on Palliative Care from the Jewish and Islamic Tradition, Evidence-Based
Complementary and Alternative Med. 1, 4 (2012).
107Faroque Khan, supra n. 101, at 271.
108For a detailed understanding of “reasonable doubt” and “robust medical evidence”, see Royal College of Physicians,
supra n. 11.
109Mohammad Zafir Al-Shahri & Abdullah Al-Khenaizan, supra n. 89 at 433.
110Peter McCullagh, Conscious in a Vegetative State? A Critique of the PVS Concept (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2004) 109.
111Islamic Medical Association of North America (IMANA), ‘Islamic Medical Ethics: The IMANA Perspective’,
paragraph 4(D).
112Abdul Rashid Gatrad, Muslim Customs Surrounding Death, Bereavement, Post-Mortem Examinations, and Organ
Transplants, 309 Brit. Med. J., 521 (1994).
113Hamdan Al-Jahdali, et al., Advance Medical Directives: a Proposed New Approach and Terminology from an Islamic
Perspective, 16(2) Med., Health Care and Phil., 163, 166 (2013).
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Consequently, technology, no matter how advanced and progressive, cannot be without boundaries.
The religious and cultural dimensions need to be considered at all times as part of patient-care.114
However, where there is competition for the same resources by another patient with a better medical
prognosis, there would be grounds to consider omission. This conflict of resource allocation can be
viewed as a tension between two principles: preservation of life and preservation of property. It can be
addressed through the concept of fiqh al-muwazanah or comparative jurisprudence or even the
jurisprudence of disagreement or theory of conflict.115 This is a logical thought process which adheres
to the hierarchy of fiqh of looking after necessities, then needs, and then embellishments. At times of
conflict, this tool could help in the decision-making process to resolve the question of whether the
seemingly futile treatment can be terminated in order to use the finite resources for the benefit of
another human life or to preserve a public resource. The application of this tool would require
consideration of the following: the text (scripture) and the context (i.e., what is the greater good, which
is the lesser of two evils, repelling evil is better than acquiring good, what is most beneficial for
mankind, and what is the welfare and detriment for the human).116 Once the aim of Sharia becomes
apparent, it should be rigorously pursued.
Thus unlike the standardized position taken in secular law, Islam does not apply a generic approach
in the management of PVS patients. Rather, the merits of each case should be individually considered.
Muslim jurists have recommended that decisions in such critical cases, i.e., where there is information
provided by humans (in this instance doctors) which has a direct coercive effect upon another human
(in this instance a PVS patient), must not be taken by just an individual person. Rather, it should be
taken collectively by a team of not only appropriately qualified and competent physicians, but equally
trustworthy ones with impeccable character.117 This ensures that the integrity of the decision making
process can be maintained since it would help eliminate errors in judgment and biasness.118 Although
the doctors in question do not necessarily have to be Muslims, Islamic law would see this opinion as
tantamount to giving a testimony on a matter.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
From the time of Bland, the first PVS case presented before the English courts, judges have consistently
countenanced the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and subsequent withholding of medical
support from patients with a PVS diagnosis. As discussed, this tendency on the part of English law to
use the same set of response for all PVS patients can be inconsistent with the religious values of the
Muslim community. For practising and devout Muslims, living as a Muslim is equally important to dying
as a Muslim. Islam is a comprehensive way of life which also informs their motivations and decisions
regarding medical issues.119 Hence they are not at liberty to compromise religious standpoints and
prescriptions on seeking medical care, nor lessen their abiding faith in God’s omnipotence120 should
they one day be, or find their family members, in a persistent vegetative state.121 The narrative within
this article has therefore argued that religious values should be allowed to illuminate thinking around
end of life medical care.
Here, it is instructive to note that adjustments based on religious grounds have already been
successfully attained in some jurisdictions for a highly controversial issue such as the definition of
death. The laws in Japan122 and Israel123 for example, currently allow death to be determined either on
the basis of neurological or cardiac-respiratory criteria. Such legal recognition of a dual definition of
death was made for the benefit of faith communities that object to a brain-based method of
114Vardit Rispler-Chaim, Islamic Medical Ethics in the 20th Century, 15 J. Med. Ethics 203 (1989).
115For a detailed discussion on fiqh al-muwazanah, see Saeed al-Harbi, supra n. 80.
116Simon Archer & Rifat Abdel Karim (eds.), Islamic Finance: The New Regulatory Challenge (Singapore: John Wiley &
Sons, 2013) Chapter 11.
117Shaikh Mullah Jeevan Ahmad Ibn Abi Saeed, Nur al Anwar (Pakistan: Maktabah Rashidiyyah, 1967), 187–188.
118Id.
119Lance Laird, et al., Muslim Patients and Health Disparities in the UK and the US, 92 Archives of Disease in Childhood
922, 923-924 (2007); Aasim Padela, et al., The Perceived Role of Islam in Immigrant Muslim Medical Practice Within the
USA: an Exploratory Qualitative Study, 34 J. Med. Ethics 365 (2008).
120Santi Rozario, Allah is the Scientist of the Scientists: Modern Medicine and Religious Healing among British
Bangladeshis, Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 101 (2008) 3.
121John Oldershaw, et al., Persistent Vegetative State: Medical, Ethical, Religious, Economic and Legal Perspectives, 1
DePaul J. of Health Care L. 495 at 511 (1996–1997).
122Japanese Organ Transplantation Law of 1997.
123The Brain-Death-Respiratory Law of 2008.
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determining death.124 Similarly, in the United States where whole brain death is accepted as the legal
standard of death nationwide, laws have been passed in New Jersey125 and New York126 which allow
faith communities to opt out of this brain-centred standard and be determined dead using a
cardiac-centred definition instead. In the UK itself, doctors are now expected to comply with Jehovah
Witnesses’ refusal to have blood transfusion even if this would result in those patients’ death.127 To the
extent that these demonstrate that religiously-sensitive care can be successfully implemented within
secular legal frameworks, the religious voice on PVS matters too could be integrated within secular
thought rather than be alienated from courtroom debates.128 Indeed, the idea and attraction of a single
law and legal interpretation for all is only appropriate for a society where everyone within shares the
same religion and culture.129
On the management of Muslim PVS patients, one needs to consider how two legal systems (secular
law and Islamic law) with both common and distinct underlying values can come to a common ground.
The examples cited at the beginning of Part III which allude to areas where this has been achieved
(e.g., Islamic banking and Muslim schools), can provide a valuable context. If public policy has, in those
areas, been adjusted to meet the religious needs of the British Muslim community, expanding this to
the realm of health would simply represent a continuation of a trend of responding sympathetically to
the needs of diverse communities and consolidating community cohesion.
As previously mentioned, all decisions for patients who lack capacity like PVS patients must
now be made in line with the best interests test outlined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and
that court approval is mandatory before life-sustaining measures are withdrawn and withheld. We
respectfully suggest that when faced with applications from doctors for declarations of lawfulness,
judges should be willing to adopt more than one way of interpreting “best interests”. After all, as
highlighted previously,130 section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that where the
determination of best interests relates to life-sustaining treatment, so far as is reasonably
ascertainable, attention must be paid to the past wishes, feelings, beliefs and values of the
patient, and the views of his/her family and others engaged in his care or interested in his
welfare. Where the PVS patient is a Muslim (or from another faith tradition that also objects, on
religious grounds, to the cessation of medical intervention purely because a diagnosis of PVS was
made),131 judges should attempt to interpret what is in the patient’s best interests in light of
religious sensitivities in much the same way as they have done for Jehovah’s Witnesses. Doctors
(either those treating the patient and/or others who have extensive experience of caring for PVS
patients) and religious leaders could be asked for their views on where each of those patients
would sit in the situations mapped out in Figure 1 above. This way, the current standardised
response to the legal management of PVS patients could be reasonably adjusted to enable the
care of Muslim PVS patients to be continued in certain conditions.
In advocating this, it is necessary to address the crucial question of how to convince doctors to
continue to treat such patients when prolongation of care is judged by them as medically
inappropriate. In other words, how does one ensure that they do not spontaneously seek a declaration
from the court to terminate the treatment? Or if they have done so and the court refuses to make a
declaration, on account of the interpretation mentioned in the preceding paragraph, that they equally
honour professional integrity to patient care. This in effect underlines the need for more heightened
awareness and appreciation among healthcare professionals about Islamic teachings. Those with very
little specific knowledge of Muslim religious life may find it difficult to conceptualise spirituality, as
understood, outside the Western religious and secular norms.132 Not only would training on this
124For further discussion, see Kartina A. Choong, Organ Procurement: a Case for Pluralism on the Definition of Death, 1(1)
J. of Med. L. and Ethics 5 (2013).
125New Jersey Declaration of Death Act 1991, Title 26.
126New Codes Rules and Regulations (1987), Title 10, s.400-16.
127Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), 4 All ER 649 (1992).
128Audil Rashid, Muslim Families: Donating Organs and Asking for Post Mortems, 85 Archives of Disease in Childhood
79 (2001).
129Rajnaara Akhtar, British Muslims and the Evolution of the Practice of Islamic Law with Particular Reference to Dispute
Resolution, 6 J. of Islamic St. Prac. Int’l 27, 38 (2010).
130See the discussion in Part II.B.1.
131E.g., those from the Jewish faith tradition – seeMeir Katz,When is Medical Care “Futile”? The Institutional Competence
of the Medical Profession Regarding the Provision of Life-Sustaining Medical Care, 90 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 1–4 (2011).
132Lance Laird, et al., supra n. 119, at 925.
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matter promote sensitive and empathetic caring for their Muslim patients,133 it could also prevent
religiously-based objections to cessation of life-sustaining treatment from leading to antagonism
and confrontation.134
Last but not least, since healthcare in the UK is delivered through a publicly funded National Health
Service (NHS), there may undoubtedly be a need to consider the issue of the potential disproportionate
use of resources by a particular community, and the moral and legal issues this may give rise to.135 To
develop an informed understanding of the challenges involved in achieving a balance (between scarce
NHS resources and the needs of particular communities for religious observance in circumstances
where continuation of care seems to be religiously obligatory or approved), extensive debate is called
for among medical, legal and religious representatives. This article hopes that it has managed to draw
appropriate attention to the urgent need for this to take place.
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